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Abstract
Using a novel database on multinational production (MP), this article investigates the
impact of preferential trade agreements on foreign affiliates’ production activities. We
find that trade agreements with investment provisions have a positive effect on MP.
On average, signing an agreement including investment provisions is associated with
increased MP up to 26% in the manufacturing sector and 34% in the services sector.
Our findings suggest that investment provisions increase MP by facilitating multina-
tionals operations in foreign markets, especially for activities requiring the proximity
of suppliers and consumers, and by helping multinationals joining global value
chains.
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1. Introduction
What is the impact of trade agreements on the activities of multinational enterprises
(MNEs)? How does the accession of countries to regional trade agreements affect MNEs’
decision to set up affiliates and produce in global value chains (GVCs)? These crucial
questions have not received sufficient attention in the literature on preferential trade agree-
ments (PTAs). The empirical literature on PTAs and GVCs has focused mostly on the im-
pact on trade flows, paying less heed to the effect of PTAs on investment patterns of
MNEs and the output of their foreign affiliates.
MNEs are fundamental players in today’s global economy, coordinating trade and
GVCs. Currently, MNEs and their network of foreign affiliates account for almost two-
thirds of world exports, leaving only one-third for independent firms not involved in
multinational production (MP).1 In particular, foreign affiliates have a disproportionate
role, being responsible for 30% of global exports. Moreover, MNEs’ foreign affiliates play
a vital part in trading services cross-border, especially for services requiring the proximity
1 Figures based on the OECD Analytical AMNE database for the year 2016.
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of suppliers and consumers (Christen and Francois, 2017).2 However, despite the econom-
ic importance of MNEs, empirical evidence on the impact of PTAs on MNEs is scarce
since data on MNE activities are only available for a subset of countries.
This article investigates the impact of PTAs on MP, defined as the production carried
out by firms outside of their country of origin (Ramondo et al., 2015). MP involves for-
eign direct investment (FDI) as firms need to establish affiliates in order to produce or sell
abroad. MP is part of a global strategy where MNEs decide from which countries they
source inputs, in which countries they produce and which markets they serve (Bernard
et al., 2018). As such, PTAs that are ‘deep’, covering not only trade liberalisation for
goods but also services, investment, competition, intellectual property and a variety of
other regulatory issues, are expected to have an impact on MP. As described by Baldwin
(2011), 21st-century regionalism is less about tariff preferences and more about governing
the whole trade-investment-IP-service nexus. In particular, this article focuses on the im-
pact on MP of trade agreements that include investment provisions. While representing
one of the fastest growing type of provision covered in PTAs, investment provisions aim
at giving access to MNEs to foreign markets and facilitating their operations. These provi-
sions give the right to MNEs to create foreign affiliates, reduce the cost of establishment
(similarly to tariff reductions for trade costs), protect foreign investment and ensure nation-
al treatment (i.e. non-discriminatory treatment post-establishment).
Our empirical analysis relies on a novel bilateral dataset with information on foreign
affiliates’ output for a comprehensive set of countries and industries. This dataset also
includes inter-country input-output (ICIO) tables split according to firm ownership. These
tables enable to discern the type of activities that foreign affiliates perform. Thanks to the
granularity of our data, this article makes four empirical contributions. First, using a struc-
tural gravity model and the variation in the membership and timing of trade agreements, we
investigate the extent to which PTAs affect foreign affiliate production. Secondly, we distin-
guish between foreign affiliates operating in the manufacturing and service sectors. Due to
the paucity of services data, the majority of research on the impact of trade agreements
looks at trade in goods; only few recent papers examine trade in services, leaving much to
be discovered about the effect of PTAs on MP of services. Thirdly, we look at the heteroge-
neous effect of investment provisions in PTAs using a novel categorisation of foreign affili-
ates’ activities based on our input-output tables split according to ownership. Fourthly, we
test two mechanisms at play behind the relationship between investment provisions and MP
by looking at whether the impact of investment provisions is stronger for industries that are
highly fragmented internationally and require proximity between suppliers and consumers.
We find that trade agreements with investment provisions seem to have a large and posi-
tive impact on MP. On average, signing a deep agreement is associated with increased MP
up to 26% in the manufacturing sector and 34% in the service sector. The fact that the ef-
fect is stronger for MP of services than of goods may be consistent with the nature of serv-
ices that may require production to be closer to final consumers. Moreover, our results
show that the entire economic effect of investment provisions cannot be fully captured in a
single year. It takes on average at least 2 years for PTAs with such provisions to increase
MP of goods and services. To rule out that our results are primarily driven by omitted
2 In the General Agreement on Trade in Services, MP in services is described as Mode 3 trade in services, that is,
trade through ‘commercial presence’. According to Andrenelli et al. (2018), the ratio of Mode 3 to cross-border
trade in services (in gross terms) is above 1 for most countries, making MP of services the most prevalent mode
to trade services.
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variables, we follow the gravity literature by including country-pair fixed effects (Baier and
Bergstrand, 2007). In addition, we control for the presence of other provisions in trade
agreements and bilateral investment treaties (BITs). To test for the presence of reverse caus-
ality (i.e. countries with higher MP signing PTAs with investment provisions), we include
lead variables to capture future levels of investment provisions, providing with an informal
test for the ‘strict exogeneity’ of investment provisions (Bergstrand et al., 2015). We also
run a falsification test randomising the allocation of investment provisions across country
pairs with a trade agreement. Finally, we propose an original instrument for investment pro-
visions to account for both a potential omitted variable and reverse causality problem. Our
combined evidence is consistent with the importance of investment provisions in driving
MP of goods and services, and no other factors seem to be driving our results.
We also explore possible mechanisms at play behind the observed positive relationship
between investment provisions and MP. To provide further evidence that the proximity of
suppliers and consumers matters in explaining this relationship, we study how the impact
of investment provisions on MP varies with the necessity of working directly with the
public. We find that the effect of investment provisions on MP is stronger for industries
where working with the public is more important. This result suggests that one channel
through which investment provisions help increase MP entails facilitating multinationals’
activities in industries where a commercial presence (i.e. establishment) is crucial. This
novel finding, combined with the fact that working directly with the public is twice more
important for services than manufacturing, confirms our conjecture that investment provi-
sions facilitate MP, especially in the services sector.
In addition, we provide evidence consistent with the prominent narrative that deep
agreements facilitate countries’ participation in GVCs. First, we find that the effect of in-
vestment provisions is stronger for foreign affiliates engaged in exporting activities, hint-
ing at a complementary relationship between trade and MP. The combination of trade and
investment provisions in PTAs, providing both lower operational costs for foreign affiliates
and lower trade costs for their imports and exports, could explain the positive impact of
deep agreements.3 Secondly, we study how the impact of investment provisions on MP
varies with an industry measure of the fragmentation of production in GVCs. This analysis
is motivated by the recent body of literature showing the crucial role of deep agreements
in increasing trade in GVCs (Mattoo et al., 2017; Lee, 2019; Dhingra et al., 2021). We
find that investment provisions tend to increase MP, particularly for industries that are
more fragmented internationally. This finding suggests that including investment provi-
sions in trade agreements may facilitate countries’ participation in GVCs.
This article is related to two strands of literature. First, recent empirical work has exam-
ined the relationship between PTAs and MNEs (among others, Baltagi et al., 2008;
Blanchard and Matschke, 2015; Osnago et al., 2019; Kox and Rojas-Romagosa, 2020).
Overall, these studies show that trade and investment agreements affect and are affected
by FDI/offshoring. However, while FDI data have the advantage of being largely available
since they are collected in the Balance of Payments, a number of significant shortcomings
3 This finding is consistent with several theoretical frameworks present in the literature. One example is the ‘know-
ledge-capital’ model of MNEs introduced by Bergstrand and Egger (2007). In the model of Kleinert and Toubal
(2010), which incorporates intermediate inputs trade into the proximity-concentration model, trade costs nega-
tively affect the volume of foreign affiliates’ sales when intermediate inputs are imported from the parent country.
The model of Ito (2013) also implies that firms will choose export-platform FDI over other types of FDI when
trade costs are decreasing and the costs of fragmenting production are low.
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arise when using these data to analyse the economic activities of MNEs. Because of differ-
ences in concepts and statistics, FDI data represent a biased measure of foreign affiliate
activity (Beugelsdijk et al., 2010; Ali-Yrkko and Leino, 2014; Blanchard and Acalin,
2016; Cadestin et al., 2018b).4 As a result, some recent works have assembled bilateral
datasets on MP (Fukui and Lakatos, 2012; Ramondo et al., 2015; Federico, 2016;
Alviarez, 2019). We contribute to this literature by developing a dataset on MP which pro-
vides a comprehensive coverage of the manufacturing and services sector for a wide set of
countries. Moreover, we are the first to use input-output tables split according to owner-
ship to account for differences in sourcing strategies and input mix between foreign- and
domestic-owned firms. Finally, for the first time we use intra-national production to shed
light on the diversion effects of PTAs from domestic- to foreign-owned firms.
Secondly, a large body of empirical research finds a positive impact of PTAs on trade
flows, especially in the long-run (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Bergstrand et al., 2015). In
particular, although some recent empirical papers have looked at the impact of deep trade
agreements on GVCs, their focus is on trade flows related to international production net-
works and not on production by foreign-owned firms. This literature has documented sev-
eral interesting facts. In the first place, deep agreements have a larger impact on trade
flows than shallow PTAs (Orefice and Rocha, 2014; Mattoo et al., 2017; Mulabdic et al.,
2017). Next, the effect is stronger for intermediate inputs trade and for trade in services
(Lee, 2019; Dhingra et al., 2021). Our article complements this literature by looking at the
impact on MP and focusing on the role of PTAs with investment provisions, which are
expected to have the most influence on MNEs’ investment and activity abroad.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a conceptual frame-
work to analyse the impact of deep agreements on MP. The data are described in Section
3 and the empirical strategy in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the relationship between in-
vestment provisions and MP of goods and services. In particular, we explore the heteroge-
neous effect of investment provisions across types of MP and industries. The final section
offers our conclusions.
2. Conceptual framework
The basic question that the article addresses is how PTAs and their investment provisions
can affect the location and production of foreign affiliates. The answer is not straightfor-
ward as it depends on the nature of the activity performed by the foreign affiliates and the
interaction between trade and investment provisions included in the agreement.
The first key distinction concerns the types of foreign affiliate activity. Theories of FDI
traditionally differentiate between horizontal and vertical FDI. Horizontal FDI is motivated
by the desire to place production close to customers and avoid trade costs. In this frame-
work, trade and investment are generally regarded as substitutes, directly related to the
trade-off between proximity and concentration (Brainard, 1997). When trade barriers are
4 First, FDI statistics provide information on cross-border capital flows that may eventually be sent to other coun-
tries without contributing at all to the local economy. This problem is especially the case for so-called special
purpose entities (SPEs), which function as a sort of central bank within MNE groups. A large presence of these
SPEs in a country typically results in high FDI flows reported for that country without the corresponding eco-
nomic effects. Accordingly, recent initiatives have been taken to collect and present FDI data without SPEs.
Second, FDI only measures part of what foreign affiliates use to finance their activities and excludes the often
substantial amount they raise from local sources. Third, as FDI is a financial input, hence excluding the contribu-
tion of labour, FDI stocks underestimate MNE activity in countries where labour is relatively more productive.
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high, it is more profitable for firms to produce directly in the consumers’ market through
FDI. But by doing so, firms lose the advantage of concentration, which is related to lower
costs when producing in one location (scale economies) and exporting products to all con-
suming countries.
While horizontal FDI can be thought of as market-seeking, vertical FDI can be thought
of as efficiency-seeking (Markusen, 2004). In other words, for vertical FDI the location of
production depends more on the local production costs than trade costs. In general, the
proliferation of GVCs and the internationalisation of supply chains can be seen as evi-
dence of vertical FDI, where trade and investment are complements instead of substitutes.
Nevertheless, when there are large reductions both in trade and investment costs, foreign
affiliates can manufacture products for final consumers in the host economy while simul-
taneously trading within vertical supply chains. Some recent evidence supports this latter
view, showing that the reality of MNEs has become more complex than the horizontal-ver-
tical dichotomy: most MNEs are engaged both in horizontal and vertical investments
abroad (Alfaro and Charlton, 2009), and most foreign affiliates have both horizontal and
vertical characteristics (Baldwin and Okubo, 2012; Herger and McCorriston, 2016; Ray,
2016). The theoretical literature has incorporated these insights into traditional models of
FDI. For instance, Kleinert and Toubal (2010) show that adding intermediate inputs into
Brainard’s (1997) model leads to opposite predictions. In this model, trade costs affect
negatively the volume of foreign affiliates’ sales when production requires intermediates,
assuming that they must be partly imported from the home country.
To account for these developments and clarify the possible mechanisms at play in the
relationship between PTAs and MP, we define four categories of activities of foreign affili-
ates based on the information available in our dataset, that is, the destination and type of
output produced:
 Horizontal MP: foreign affiliate production of final products sold to the domestic
market;
 Vertical MP: foreign affiliates exporting intermediate inputs for production activ-
ities in other countries;
 Export-platform MP: foreign affiliates exporting final products to foreign con-
sumers; and
 Domestic MP: foreign affiliate production of intermediate inputs sold to the do-
mestic market.
Since we have no information on bilateral imports of intermediates, we cannot fully
identify the vertical specialisation of foreign affiliates. Nevertheless, Vertical MP and
Domestic MP are measures related to the fragmentation of the production process: Vertical
MP indicates production by foreign affiliates participating in international supply chains,
while Domestic MP includes foreign affiliates participating in domestic supply chains.5
Conversely, Horizontal MP and Export-platform MP represent foreign affiliates that take
the products/services forward towards the customers, whether in the domestic market or in
foreign markets.
The type of activity matters for the analysis of PTAs as trade and investment are more
likely to be complements in the context of the fragmentation of production and substitutes
5 For more information on the involvement of foreign-owned companies in domestic value chains, see Cadestin
et al. (2019).
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when the proximity with consumers is the objective of MP.6 Disentangling the destination
market of MP is also critical, as some PTAs are attractive because they open a large do-
mestic market to foreign MNEs, while other PTAs can potentially offer access to markets
in third countries in the context of export-platform FDI (Ekholm et al., 2007). The latter
would have a higher impact on the intensive margin of MP rather than its extensive mar-
gin (since trade flows then replace MP).7
The second key distinction concerns the nature of the interaction between trade and in-
vestment provisions in PTAs. PTAs limited to trade in goods (and described as ‘shallow’)
entail a reciprocal reduction in tariffs that are usually modelled in the literature as a sym-
metric trade liberalisation among the members of the agreement. Such PTAs may affect
MP, though their impact is ambiguous. As shown in Kleinert and Toubal (2010), we ex-
pect shallow PTAs to have a positive impact on foreign affiliates importing goods from
home through the abolition of tariffs or preferential rates on the imported inputs or final
products. In contrast, the effect should be negative when trade liberalisation incentives
trade rather than FDI as predicted by the proximity-concentration model.
When PTAs start to include provisions on investment and a broader set of policies in
the context of offshoring and GVCs, the nature of the problem they solve goes beyond
market access (Antràs and Staiger, 2012). Overall, we would expect deep trade agreements
to have an ambiguous impact on MP of goods. PTAs not only have provisions on the es-
tablishment of foreign firms similar to market access but also add provisions on investment
protection and national treatment (Lesher and Miroudot, 2006; Kotschwar, 2009; Chornyi
et al., 2016). Such provisions (which are defined as investment provisions in our empirical
analysis) are expected to have a positive impact on MNEs’ investment decisions and activ-
ities abroad, particularly when their enforcement is warranted by specific mechanisms,
such as an investor-state dispute settlement. Other deep provisions may increase or de-
crease MP, depending on whether they improve the attractiveness of producing via foreign
affiliates rather than trading at arm’s length. For instance, Osnago et al. (2019) show that
deep provisions in PTAs may increase or decrease vertical FDI, depending on whether
they improve the contractibility of intermediate inputs or headquarter services, with the for-
mer increasing and the latter reducing vertical FDI. Ultimately, the verdict on what forces
dominate is empirical and will crucially depend on the content of the trade agreements.
In the case of services, we expect a positive relationship between trade agreements and
MP for two reasons. First, some services are difficult to provide cross-border and require
the proximity of suppliers and consumers (Christen and Francois, 2017). PTAs with in-
vestment provisions (or services provisions covering trade through a commercial presence)
should have a large impact on the supply of such services since no proximity-
concentration trade-off is at play for these activities. Secondly, while provisions covering
cross-border trade in services may incentivise trade rather than MP, those provisions con-
sist of legal bindings and do not remove trade barriers on a preferential basis (Sauvé and
Shingal, 2011). While these legal bindings can have a positive impact on trade by reduc-
ing uncertainty in the trade regime, they are not comparable to tariff reductions for trade
in goods; consequently, they should play a minor role in affecting MP.
6 We further investigate these channels in Section 5.3 by examining differences across industries in terms of frag-
mentation of production and proximity to consumers.
7 It should be noted, however, that our categories focus on post-establishment foreign affiliate activity rather than
the MNE’s decision to set up a foreign affiliate, as our dataset (which is not at the firm level) does not allow dis-
tinguishing the extensive margin from the intensive margin of MP.










Our analysis relies on two novel databases on MP.8 The first is a bilateral database on
MP, with data harmonised across countries and made consistent with national accounts.
The dataset covers the period 2000–2014 and builds on the OECD AMNEs statistics and
the World Input-Output Database (WIOD). This bilateral database on MP covers 41 coun-
tries, accounting for more than 85% of world GDP and 43 industries (across the primary,
manufacturing and services sectors).9 Each observation in the database provides informa-
tion about the gross output (in US$) of foreign affiliates in a host country i, operating in
an industry k, controlled by a partner country j.10 Our dataset also includes the output of
domestic-owned firms, information that we use to account for intra-national production.
Secondly, we split ICIO tables (from WIOD) according to ownership, disentangling the
contribution to trade and output of domestic- and foreign-owned firms. This allows us to
decompose MP in foreign affiliate production of intermediate inputs and final products
and in production sold domestically and exported. Splitting the ICIO according to owner-
ship helps account for the heterogeneity among firms regarding their sourcing strategies.
In traditional ICIOs, foreign- and domestic-owned firms share the same production func-
tion and rely on the same mix of inputs. However, important differences exist in the way
these two types of firms use foreign and domestic inputs. For example, Koopman et al.
(2008) find much lower ratios of domestic value added in the exports of foreign-owned
firms in China.
Since 2000, FA activity has been rapidly increasing, reaching almost 20 trillion US dol-
lars in 2014.11 Table 1 disaggregates the type of MP into output sold domestically and
output exported, and between intermediates and finals. In the manufacturing sector, export
motives are important and increasing over time, making up 48% of foreign affiliate pro-
duction in 2014. Conversely, in the services sector, the lion’s share of MP activity is dedi-
cated to serving domestic markets, with domestic activity accounting for more than 80%
of MP.
3.2. The Design of Trade Agreements database
Our source of information on trade agreements and their investment provisions is the
Design of Trade Agreements database by Dür et al. (2014). This dataset builds on the list
of agreements notified to the World Trade Organisation, providing the widest coverage of
trade agreements available. The dataset has information on more than 620 agreements and
covers all PTAs in force in our period of interest. It includes a broad set of provision cate-
gories and distinguishes between substantive provisions and shallow provisions.
The dummy variable that we create for PTAs with investment provisions relies on the
information answering the question ‘Does this agreement include an investment chapter?’.
8 See Appendix Section C for further details on these two data sources.
9 See Appendix Table A2 for the list of countries and Table A3 for the list of industries.
10 A foreign affiliate is defined as an enterprise resident in a country which is under the control of an institutional
unit not resident in the same country. The concept of control refers to a firm controlling 50% or more of the or-
dinary shares or voting power of another firm.
11 For more information on MP patterns across time, regions and industries, see Cadestin et al. (2018b). To note
that when FA activity is measured in gross terms at the world level, there is some double counting involved
(Miroudot and Ye, 2020).
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We regard the provisions as substantive when they go beyond ‘endeavors without specific
scope’ and are not limited to the reference to an existing BIT.12 We consider investment
provisions within and beyond the services chapter since trade agreements generally start
with a service chapter covering Mode 3 trade in services (commercial presence) and can
reach the full extent of an investment chapter covering both goods and services and
addressing investment protection as well as investment liberalisation.
We also regard PTAs as having substantive investment provisions even when investment
disciplines are limited to services for the following three reasons. First, most barriers to
FDI are found in services industries and these sector-specific regulations create additional
costs for multinational firms. Through provisions on services, most of the barriers to MP
are already addressed. Secondly, many of the market access and national treatment com-
mitments on services are ‘horizontal’ and do not distinguish manufacturing firms from ser-
vice firms. For example, provisions for the temporary movement of people allowing intra-
corporate transferees to obtain specific visas on the basis of the PTA are applied to all
firms. There is no condition or test to check whether the parent company or the affiliate is
in a manufacturing or service industry. While trade agreements distinguish trade in goods
from trade in services (on the basis of the products traded), there is no legal basis or such
categorisation for most of the domestic laws relevant for the operations of foreign affili-
ates. Therefore, provisions on services benefit manufacturing firms to a large extent
(Cadot et al., 2006). Lastly, the fact that a PTA covers investment in services also implies
that manufacturing foreign affiliates will have easier access to the services inputs supplied
by their parent company (as the agreement covers all trade in services) or other foreign
affiliates in the host economy. Manufacturing firms would also benefit from the services
provisions in this case. For instance, foreign suppliers of services are shown to be crucial
in providing supporting activities to the functioning of GVCs (Miroudot and Cadestin,
2017).
One assumption in the construction of the PTA variables is that when more than one bi-
lateral trade agreement is in place, we add up the provisions included in each agreement
based on the lex specialis derogat legi generali. This doctrine states that if two laws gov-
ern the same factual situation, a law governing a specific subject matter (lex specialis)
Table 1. Share of type of activity in total MP, 2000–2014
Goods 2000 2005 2010 2014 Services 2000 2005 2010 2014
FA dom int 0.37 0.34 0.35 0.35 FA dom int 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.47
FA dom final 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.17 FA dom final 0.41 0.39 0.36 0.35
FA exp int 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.27 FA exp int 0.07 0.08 0.10 0.12
FA exp final 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.21 FA exp final 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06
Note: This table decomposes the gross output (in US$) of foreign affiliates in Years 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2014.
In particular, FA dom int indicates foreign affiliate production of intermediates sold domestically; FA dom final
foreign affiliate production of finals sold domestically; FA exp int foreign affiliate export of intermediates; and FA
exp final foreign affiliate export of finals.
12 The fact that we can identify substantive investment provisions is one reason for choosing the DESTA dataset
as opposed to other PTA datasets.
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overrides a law governing only general matters (lex generalis). The implication is that a
bilateral agreement with substantive investment provisions overrules an agreement not
covering investment.
Table 2 shows the share of pairs of countries with each type of agreement and with a
BIT in our bilateral dataset.13 Overall, PTAs with investment provisions (Inv Prov) have
increased rapidly in the 2000–2014 period. In 2014, 46% of country pairs have a trade
agreement that includes substantive provisions on investment, compared to only 14% in
2000. Moreover, 50% of country pairs have a trade agreement including a substantive pro-
vision on trade in services (Serv prov) from only 33% in 2000. In contrast, country pairs
with a BIT increased moderately from 44% in 2000 to 50% in 2014. This finding con-
firms the conjecture that trade agreements have become increasingly popular in dealing
with cross-border investments, often replacing BITs or being signed between countries not
having a BIT in force.
4. Empirical strategy
To investigate the impact of trade agreements on MP, we use a specification derived from
a gravity model. Although the gravity model was developed to study trade in goods, it has
recently been applied to trade in services (Kimura and Lee, 2006; Anderson et al., 2014),
FDI (Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007; Kleinert and Toubal, 2010; Anderson et al., 2019) and
MP (Ramondo et al., 2015; Alviarez, 2019).
Our empirical model is based on the standard structural gravity framework (see Yotov
et al., 2016 for a review). To investigate the role of investment provisions in affecting MP
beyond tariff reductions, we thus estimate the following reduced-form specification on a
panel dataset covering the years 2000–2014:
MPijt ¼ expðaþ b1PTAijt þ b2Inv Provijt þ djt þ wit þ cijÞ þ eijt; (1)
where MPijt denotes MP of goods or services in country i controlled by a parent company
in country j at time t. PTAijt is 1 if countries i and j have a free trade agreement or cus-
toms union in place at time t. Inv Provijt is equal to 1 if countries i and j have a PTA with
Table 2. Share of country pairs with each type of agreement, 2000–2014
Variables 2000 2005 2010 2014
PTA 0.50 0.55 0.57 0.60
Inv Prov 0.14 0.34 0.40 0.46
Serv Prov 0.33 0.43 0.46 0.50
BIT 0.44 0.47 0.49 0.49
Note: Inv Prov indicates trade agreements including a substantive investment provision, Serv prov including a
substantive provision stipulating the liberalisation of trade in services, and BIT stands for bilateral investment
treaties.
13 These dummy variables equal 1 at the date of entry into force of an agreement instead of the date of signature.
Data on BITs come from the World Trade Institute.
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investment provisions in force at time t. The coefficient of Inv Provijt is equivalent to an
interaction variable with the PTA variable since there are no observations where a country
pair has investment provisions without having a PTA in force. Moreover, with the inclu-
sion of country-pair fixed effects, the identifying variation in this regression is provided
by the entry into force of a new PTA or the addition of investment provisions to pre-
existing PTAs. As in the case when a country pair already has a PTA limited to trade in
goods and later becomes part of another PTA (perhaps with different members involved)
with investment provisions or when a country pair signs a PTA covering investment, but
the date of entry into force of the investment provisions is different from the rest of the
agreement.14
We follow the gravity literature (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007) and control for potential
omitted variables through partner-time, destination-time and country-pair fixed effects (djt,
wit and cij, respectively). However, there could be some omitted time-variant bilateral vari-
ables which may not be captured by our set of fixed effects. We partly address this con-
cern by controlling for the presence of other deep provisions that may drive the
relationship between investment provisions and MP. Unfortunately, deep provisions are
highly collinear among themselves (as shown in Appendix Table A5). To tackle this issue,
we either include each provision as a stand-alone category in the specification or we add a
measure of trade agreement depth, based on the number of provisions embedded in a
given trade agreement (as in Mattoo et al., 2017). To test for the presence of reverse caus-
ality, we include lead variables of Inv Prov as proposed by Bergstrand et al. (2015).
Finally, to account conclusively for both the potential omitted variable and the reverse
causation problem, we propose an instrument for investment provisions. Section 5.1.3 dis-
cusses the construction of the instrument and the results of the control function approach
using the instrument.
When estimating (1), we include the case where country i and country j are the same,
that is, production by domestic-owned firms. As summarised in Yotov (2021), accounting
for intra-national production is crucial when comparing country pairs with a PTA and
without a PTA. The standard gravity framework using only MP data estimates the effect
of trade agreements on MP between a given pair of countries relative to the effect of trade
agreements on MP for a pair of countries without a trade agreement. Instead, to appropri-
ately estimate the effect of trade agreements, we should also consider the effect of PTAs
relative to the corresponding effects within national markets. The underlying assumption is
that domestic-owned and foreign-owned firms are directly competing to serve consumers
or firms within a country, and including intra-national production allows to explicitly ac-
count for the diversion effects of PTAs from domestic towards international production.
As shown in the gravity trade literature, not including intra-national trade flows is incon-
sistent with the theoretical basis of the gravity model (Yotov, 2021), leading to
underestimated gravity variables (Dai et al., 2014).
To allow for adjustments in MP in response to changes in trade agreements, we use 2-
year intervals instead of estimating the specification using annual data.15 We estimate our
gravity specification using the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator pro-
14 The list of treaties providing the identifying variation in Equation 1 is provided in Table A1.
15 While the gravity literature suggests using 3-, 4- or 5-year intervals (Yotov et al., 2016), we use 2-year intervals
to retain a larger number of observations. Recent work by Egger et al. (2020) lends support to this approach,
showing that using annual data improves the efficiency of the estimates due to the use of more data points.
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posed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006).16 The PPML is our chosen estimator because it has
the advantage of accounting for potential heteroscedasticity in foreign affiliate activity and
dealing with sample selection, since it keeps zeroes in observations by allowing inclusion
of the dependent variable in level.17
5. Investment provisions and MP
Using the empirical strategy described in the previous section, we study the relationship
between MP and investment provisions in PTAs. We first analyse how patterns of MP
vary with the entry into force of deep agreements before exploring the channels through
which investment provisions can increase MP. In particular, we investigate how the effect
of investment provisions on MP varies across types of MP and industries. We present evi-
dence suggesting that investment provisions increase MP, especially in industries where
working directly with the public is necessary and those that are more fragmented inter-
nationally. We also show that the impact of investment provisions on MP tends to be
stronger for foreign affiliates’ exporting activities.
5.1. Results for MP of goods and services
In this section, we examine the relationship between trade agreements and MP of goods
and services, that is, the impact of PTAs on the output of foreign affiliates in the manufac-
turing and services sectors. Table 3 presents the results from estimating (1). Columns 1–5
show the coefficients for MP of goods and Columns 6–10 for MP of services.
Columns 1 and 6 display results from a specification including only the PTA dummy.
This coefficient is positive and large, indicating that signing a PTA increases MP of goods
and services between parties by about 30 and 26%, respectively.18 To test the role of invest-
ment provisions, we include in Columns 2 and 7 a dummy variable, Inv Prov, accounting
for the presence of a substantive investment provision included in the treaty. The average
effect is identified from country pairs that entered into a PTA with investment provisions or
first had a PTA in force and later had a PTA with investment provisions. The coefficients
suggest that the entry into force of a PTA including an investment provision increases on
average MP of goods and services by 36% and 52%, respectively. As expected, the effect
of investment provisions is larger for MP of services than goods, hinting at the particular
importance of proximity to customers for services. Another reason is that many of the bar-
riers to foreign investment and foreign affiliate activity, such as foreign equity limits, dis-
criminatory licensing conditions or the non-recognition of qualifications earned abroad, are
found in the services sector (Andrenelli et al., 2018). Interestingly, the coefficient of shallow
PTAs becomes insignificant when including Inv Prov, indicating that investment provisions
make up for all the impact of deep trade agreements on MP in the period considered.19
To disentangle the effect of investment provisions from other provisions in deep agree-
ments and policy variables, we augment our baseline specification by adding a control for
16 The PPML regressions are implemented in STATA using the command ppmlhdfe developed by Correia et al.
(2020) to deal with high-dimensional fixed effects.
17 The observations equal to zero make up around 5% at the bilateral country level. Instead, at the sectoral level,
the observations equal to zero make up around 60% of our sample.
18 The coefficients (b) in the PPML regressions are interpreted as (eb  1) % change in MP.
19 These findings are robust to alternative specifications. See Appendix section B for the results.
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the depth of PTAs (in Columns 3 and 8),20 a dummy variable accounting for the presence
of services provisions (in Columns 4 and 9) and a dummy variable indicating whether the
country pair have a BIT in place (in Columns 5 and 10). The coefficients of investment
provisions remain positive and statistically significant. While the magnitudes decrease
when we control for the depth of trade agreements, the coefficient of investment provi-
sions is still sizeable: the entry into force of a PTA including an investment provision
increases on average MP of goods and services by 26% and 34%, respectively. Instead,
the coefficient of services provisions is not significant for MP of goods and remains sig-
nificant, but only at the 10% level, for MP of services. This finding is consistent
with Lee (2019), suggesting that services provisions are crucial in increasing international
trade at the expense of MP. Another potential explanation is that services provisions
are often non-discriminatory in nature. Services liberalisation should therefore reduce the
costs of production for all firms, benefiting both those foreign- and domestic-owned. In
contrast, investment provisions concern more the policy regime applied to foreign firms
only.
Finally, the coefficient of BIT is also not significant for MP of goods and only signifi-
cant at the 10% level for MP of services. This result is in line with previous literature
finding mixed results for the impact of BITs on FDI at the aggregate level (Busse et al.,
2010; Egger and Merlo, 2012; Falvey and Foster-McGregor, 2017). Furthermore, Osnago
et al. (2019) find BITs to be unimportant in driving vertical FDI in the period 2003–2011
Table 3. PTA effects on MP of goods and services
Dependent variable: aggregate MP
Goods Services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
PTA 0.265*** 0.0388 0.168 0.0444 0.0376 0.231*** 0.115 0.331** 0.236* 0.115
(0.0866) (0.0843) (0.116) (0.107) (0.0842) (0.0494) (0.0936) (0.152) (0.123) (0.0934)
Inv prov – 0.309*** 0.230** 0.288*** 0.309*** 0.418*** 0.295** 0.359*** 0.418***
– (0.0941) (0.0954) (0.0946) (0.0938) (0.0982) (0.118) (0.105) (0.0981)
Depth – 0.0504** – – – – 0.0597* – –
– – (0.0207) – – – – (0.0325) – –
Serv prov – – – 0.107 – – – – 0.193* –
– – – (0.0853) – – – – (0.108) –
BIT – – – – 0.140 – – – – 0.250*
– – – – (0.106) – – – – (0.132)
Observations 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,440 13,408 13,408 13,408 13,408 13,408
Note: The dependent variable in Columns 1–5 is MP of goods and in Columns 6–10 is MP of services. All speci-
fications are obtained with data for Years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014; all include part-
ner-time, host-time and partner-host fixed effects and are estimated using PPML. Serv prov denotes trade
agreements including a substantive provision stipulating the liberalisation of trade in services. Depth goes from 0
to 6, covering the following provisions: services, competition, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical bar-
riers to trade, public procurement and intellectual property rights. Standard errors are clustered by country pairs.
The p-values read as follows: *p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
20 On average, the number of provisions in trade agreements steadily increased from 2 provisions in 2000 to 3 in
2014.
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using firm-level data for Germany, Japan and the USA. Finally, while BITs are expected
to be a positive determinant of FDI, their effect on the activities of foreign affiliates once
established is unclear. In conclusion, our findings suggest that investment provisions are
associated with higher MP, and no other relevant policy variable seems to be driving our
results.
5.1.1. Dynamic effect of investment provisions
A concern with the previous results is that country-pair fixed effects do not properly ac-
count for the possible ‘reverse causality’ between MP and PTAs. This issue arises because
countries’ participation in PTAs is not random. The more two countries are economically
integrated, the greater the incentives to deepen their bilateral/regional agreements. To ad-
dress this concern, we include 2-year lead variable of Inv Prov to capture future levels of
trade agreements, providing an informal test for the ‘strict exogeneity’ of trade agreements
(Baier and Bergstrand, 2007). The lead variable allows assessing whether countries tend to
sign trade agreements with countries hosting more of their MNEs’ investments and foreign
affiliate activity. In addition, we include lagged variables of Inv Prov to account for the
fact that the effect of investment provisions may take time to materialise, as shown by
Baier and Bergstrand (2007), Bergstrand et al. (2015) and Mattoo et al. (2017) for the im-
pact of trade agreements on international trade.
Figure 1 illustrates the dynamic effect of investment provisions on MP of goods and
services.21 These results are based on the specifications in Columns 3 and 8 of Table 3,
including leads and lags of the variable Inv Prov. The results suggest that the entire eco-
nomic effect of deep agreements on MP cannot be fully captured in a single year. It takes,
on average, at least 2 years for the effect to materialise. In addition, the coefficients of the
lead variables are not significant and close to zero, downplaying the role of reverse causal-
ity in our findings.
5.1.2. Falsification test
An alternative approach to provide further support to the estimates in Table 3 is as fol-
lows. For each country pair with a trade agreement, we randomly assign a value (either 1
or 0) to Inv Provijt and then re-run the regression. Figure 2 shows the distribution of these
regression coefficients obtained from 2000 random draws. The randomised coefficients are
centred around zero and are distant from the estimated effect of investment provisions
(shown by the dashed lines) corresponding to Columns 3 and 8 of Table 3. These results
confirm that our main findings are not driven by some random allocation of investment
provisions across country pairs.
5.1.3. Instrumenting for investment provisions
To verify conclusively that the presence of investment provisions is the factor driving our
results, we use an instrumental variable (IV). In the spirit of Osnago et al. (2019), we pro-
pose an instrument that is constructed as the average between the number of PTAs with
investment provisions that each partner and host country have with other countries,
21 The regression outputs used for these figures are available upon request.
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Figure 1. Dynamic effects of investment provisions on MP of goods and services.
Note: Results are based on the regression specification in Column 3 for goods and Column 8 for
services in Table 3, which is augmented to include leads and lags of the variable of interest. The
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Figure 2. Falsification test with random levels of investment provision (2000 reps).
Note: The regression specification is equal to our baseline specification in (1). The dashed lines
show the estimated effect corresponding to Column 3 for goods and Column 8 for services in
Table 3.
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, where Nit is the number of trade agreements of
country i in force in year t, excluding the agreement with country j, while Njt is the num-
ber of trade agreements of country j in force in year t, excluding the agreement with coun-
try i. S is the set of third countries with whom i and j have signed an agreement
(excluding with themselves). The rationale of this instrument comes from the bandwagon
effect that has characterised the recent surge in PTAs. The key idea is that the signing of
trade agreements can induce excluded countries to sign similar agreements.22 In addition,
a recent body of empirical literature shows that countries tend to sign similar PTAs by rep-
licating existing treaties (Allee and Elsig, 2019; Mattoo et al., 2020). Therefore, we expect
that the higher the number of investment provisions that country j has in force with third
countries, the more likely country i will be to sign an agreement including an investment
provision with country j (and vice versa).
Table 4 presents the results using the control function approach.23 The first-stage results
(in Column 1) suggest that our IV is relevant since the coefficient of the investment provi-
sion dummy is statistically significant at the 1% level. In addition, the effective F-statistic
of the first-stage indicates that the instrument is not weak.24 The coefficients of the invest-
ment provision dummy remain positive and significant in all specifications. The magni-
tudes are markedly larger than our baseline results, which appear to be affected by a
downward bias. This evidence indicates that the estimates in Table 3 are a reliable and
conservative assessment of the impact of investment provisions on MP.
5.2. Heterogeneous effect of investment provisions across type of MP
In this section, we investigate whether the effect of PTAs on MP depends on the type of
activity performed by foreign affiliates in the host country. We test for these predictions
by decomposing MP in Domestic MP (FA domestic sales of intermediate inputs),
Horizontal MP (FA domestic sales of finals products), Vertical MP (FA exports of inter-
mediate inputs) and Export-platform MP (FA exports of final products).25 As discussed in
Section 2, while Horizontal MP and Export-platform MP represent foreign affiliates that
take the products/services forward towards the customers, Vertical MP and Domestic MP
22 See Baldwin and Jaimovich (2012) for a review of the mechanisms behind the proliferation of PTAs in past
decades.
23 We estimate our IV using the control function approach developed by Wooldridge (2015). This approach is use-
ful for estimating an instrumental variable in a non-linear model as described in Lin and Wooldridge (2019). In
particular, this technique is based on a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, the dependent variable is the en-
dogenous variable (a dummy indicating whether the agreement includes an investment provision), and the
right-hand-side variables are the instrument, the PTA dummy and the usual fixed effects. The first stage is esti-
mated using OLS. The second stage is, instead, estimated using PPML, including the residuals from the first
stage in addition to the endogenous variable, the PTA dummy and the usual fixed effects. The dependent vari-
able in the second stage is MP of either goods or services. The objective of including the residuals from the first
stage is to control for the variation in investment provisions not explained by our IV in the first stage. As a re-
sult, the coefficient of the investment provision dummy (in the second stage) indicates the effect of investment
provisions on MP netted from the endogeneity in investment provisions.
24 As discussed in Andrews et al. (2019), we present the effective first-stage F-statistic of Olea and Pflueger
(2013) because it is robust to heteroscedasticity and clustering.
25 While more than 80% of foreign affiliate activity in the services sector is dedicated to serve the domestic mar-
ket, we also consider FA selling intermediate and final services to foreign markets. For instance, branches or
affiliates of banks providing financial services to consumers in neighbouring countries, such as US banks estab-
lished in London to serve EU customers.
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are measures related to the fragmentation of the production processes. Specifically,
Vertical MP indicates production by foreign affiliates participating in international supply
chains, and Domestic MP includes foreign affiliates participating in domestic supply
chains.
Tables 5 and 6 illustrate the results of the empirical strategy decomposing MP by type
(intermediates versus final products) and destination (domestic versus foreign demand).
The coefficients indicate that investment provisions increase both the domestic and export-
ing activities of foreign affiliates, with the effect being stronger for MP of services. The
only exception is for foreign affiliates engaging in Horizontal MP of goods, where trade
seems to act more as a substitute for MP in serving the local demand. As discussed in
Section 2, we expect deep agreements to have an ambiguous impact on MP of goods.
While investment provisions should reduce barriers to foreign affiliates’ entry and opera-
tions, conversely, the effect is expected to be negative when deep agreements incentivise
trade rather than MP.
Furthermore, the coefficients of vertical MP and export-platform MP are large and sig-
nificant, suggesting that investment provisions are helpful in boosting MNEs’ participation
in GVCs. The complementarity between trade and investment provisions, providing both
lower operational costs for foreign affiliates and lower trade costs for their imports and
exports, could be the main channel explaining why investment provisions have a stronger
impact on vertical MP and export-platform MP. Interestingly, this is also the case for serv-
ices when they are part of fragmented production processes. While most services activities
are domestic-oriented, it should be noted that some service industries rely on vertical and
export-platform MP and have levels of fragmentation of production similar to the manu-
facturing sector (see Timmer et al., 2021).
Table 4. IV results—control function approach
(1) (2) (3)
First-stage Goods Services
Inv prov FA output FA output
PTA 0.246*** 0.126 0.261***
(0.0454) (0.0993) (0.0969)




Inv prov (IV) 0.290***
(0.0482)
Observations 13,448 13,440 13,408
Feff-stat 35.6 37.0
Note: The dependent variable in Column 1 is the investment provision dummy, in Column 2, MP of goods and
in Column 3, MP of services. All specifications are obtained with data for Years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008,
2010, 2012 and 2014; all include partner-time, host-time and partner-host fixed effects and are estimated using
PPML. Residuals denotes the residuals from the first-stage regression estimated in Column 1. Inv prov (IV) indi-
cates the instrument of the investment provision dummy. Feff-stat refers to the effective F-statistic developed by
Olea and Pflueger (2013). Standard errors are clustered by country pairs. The p-values read as follows: *p< 0.1,
**p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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Finally, the (slightly) significant negative sign for the PTA variable in the case of verti-
cal MP of services suggests that for the production of services inputs that are further
exported, shallow PTAs and PTAs with investment provisions may have opposite effects.
One explanation is that the PTA variable might identify country pairs with restrictive trade
and investment regimes for services activities that discourage vertical specialisation while
also preventing countries from entering into deeper PTAs.
5.3. Mechanisms through which investment provisions can affect MP
We now turn to understanding the mechanisms driving the positive relationship between
investment provisions and MP. As shown in the previous section, a first important channel
through which investment provisions might increase MP is by facilitating the
Table 5. PTA effects on MP of goods: Decomposition of gross output
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Domestic MP Horizontal MP Vertical MP Export-platform MP
PTA 0.0683 0.213 0.0457 0.0705
(0.0915) (0.132) (0.0938) (0.0988)
Inv prov 0.239** 0.151 0.328*** 0.227**
(0.108) (0.129) (0.0997) (0.111)
Observations 13,440 13,432 13,440 13,440
Note: The dependent variable is FA domestic sales of intermediate inputs in Column 1; FA domestic sales of final
products in Column 2; FA exports of intermediate inputs in Column 3; FA exports of final products in Column 4.
All estimates are obtained with data for Years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014; all include
partner-time, host-time and partner-host fixed effects and are estimated using PPML. Standard errors are clustered
by country pairs. The p-values read as follows: *p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
Table 6. PTA effects on MP of services: Decomposition of gross output
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Domestic MP Horizontal MP Vertical MP Export-platform MP
PTA 0.111 0.0860 0.169* 0.0986
(0.102) (0.0974) (0.0879) (0.0934)
Inv prov 0.389*** 0.387*** 0.478*** 0.491***
(0.110) (0.0976) (0.0834) (0.0865)
Observations 13,408 13,408 13,408 13,408
Note: The dependent variable is FA domestic sales of intermediate services in Column 1; FA domestic sales of
final services in Column 2; FA exports of intermediate services in Column 3; FA exports of final services in
Column 4. All estimates are obtained with data for Years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014;
all include partner-time, host-time and partner-host fixed effects and are estimated using PPML. Standard errors
are clustered by country pairs. The p-values read as follows: *p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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fragmentation of production processes. A recent body of literature has shown that deep
agreements have a positive effect on boosting GVC trade (Mattoo et al., 2017; Lee, 2019;
Dhingra et al., 2021). However, the effect on MP is not well documented. Since invest-
ment provisions are expected to liberalise behind-the-border barriers detrimental to multi-
national activity (Baldwin, 2011; Mattoo et al., 2017), we expect a larger role for
investment provisions in facilitating MP in industries that are more fragmented internation-
ally. To test this hypothesis, we explore how the effect of investment provisions on MP
varies with the level of fragmentation of production, measured with the supply chain frag-
mentation (SCF) ratio introduced by Timmer et al. (2021).
Proximity to customers is another crucial motive driving MP, especially for services
activities. Christen and Francois (2017) show that the proximity between supplier and con-
sumer matters in explaining foreign affiliate activity relative to cross-border sales in many
service industries. Building on this finding, we conjecture that investment provisions may
also facilitate multinationals’ activity abroad, especially in industries in which the activity
is provided in close proximity to customers. In order to measure this proximity require-
ment, we use the O*NET measure ‘Performing for or Working Directly with the Public’
as a proxy for the importance of directly interacting with consumers. Among many, this
approach was used in previous works studying the importance of routine tasks Costinot et
al. (2011) and communicating with consumers (Oldenski, 2012). Following this literature,
we match the relevant task measures from O*NET to the industry-level MP data. We ag-
gregate the raw O*NET scores up to the industry level as the employment weighted aver-
age across occupations for each industry and merge them with MP data to obtain an index
of the importance of working directly with the public in each industry. We replicate this
exercise for all the years in our dataset, obtaining time variation in this industry-specific
measure. The use of O*NET (which is specific to the US labour market) is motivated by
data availability, as O*NET is the only dataset providing detailed information about tasks
performed by workers (across occupations and industries) over time. This loss of measure-
ment precision associated with the use of O*NET for all countries in the estimation sam-
ple is also motivated by the fact that the US should be representative of the nature of
tasks that workers in each occupation perform due to its large workforce and significant
production in all industries.
We thus study the importance of these two mechanisms by using disaggregated data on
MP at the industry level. We estimate the following regression specification:
MPijkt ¼ expðaþ b1PTAijt þ b2Inv Provijt þ b3BITijt þ b4Inv Provijt  SCFkt
þ b5Inv ProvijtProximitykt þ dikt þ djkt þ dijkÞ þ eijkt
(2)
where MPijkt is the output of foreign affiliates in industry k in host country i from partner
country j. An industry corresponds to one of the two-digit ISIC rev. 4 categories (shown
in Appendix Table A3). In this specification, SCFkt is the SCF ratio and reflects all
imports of intermediate inputs along the value chain (from all countries) in total output in
each industry. Proximitykt is a measure of the importance of working directly with the pub-
lic in each industry. All specifications include partner country-industry-time, host country-
industry-time and host country-partner country-industry fixed effects.
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We present the results from estimating regression 2 in Table 7. Column 1 shows our
baseline specification from Column 2 of Table 3 for industry-level MP data. The estimated
coefficient of investment provisions is 0.293, which is equivalent to an effect of invest-
ment provisions on MP of roughly 35%. In Column 2, we interact the dummy accounting
for the presence of an investment provision in trade agreements with the SCF ratio in
each industry. The coefficient of this interaction is large and highly significant, suggesting
that investment provisions matter substantially more for multinational activity in industries
with production processes fragmented internationally. For instance, the magnitude of the
interaction term implies that the impact of investment provisions on MP is about 46%
larger in producing electronic and optical equipment than that of producing textile and lea-
ther products.26 This finding suggests that one of the channels through which investment
provisions increase MP is by facilitating multinationals’ participation in GVCs.
In Column 3, we interact our measure of the importance of working directly with the
public with the investment provision dummy. The effect of investment provisions on MP
is larger for industries where working directly with customers is more important. This
finding suggests that investment provisions are especially crucial for industries that require
proximity between suppliers and customers. In Column 4, we jointly explore the variation
in investment provisions for both interactions. The coefficients are similar to prior specifi-
cations. Overall, this evidence indicates that investment provisions increase MP through at
least two channels. The first involves facilitating multinationals’ access to foreign markets,
especially for industries where proximity to the final customers is a necessary requirement.
Table 7. Mechanisms at play
Dependent variable: industry-specific MP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PTA 0.00352 0.0134 0.0157 0.00617
(0.0478) (0.0489) (0.0527) (0.0523)
Inv prov 0.293*** 0.0588 0.282*** 0.526***
(0.0454) (0.0715) (0.104) (0.124)
Inv prov  GVC – 1.498*** – 0.955***
– (0.245) – (0.256)
Inv prov  Proximity – – 0.208*** 0.214***
– – (0.0361) (0.0355)
Observations 373,752 373,752 320,754 320,754
Note: The dependent variable in Columns 1–4 is MP of goods and services at the industry level. All specifica-
tions are obtained with data for Years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014; all include partner-in-
dustry-time, host-industry-time and partner-host-industry fixed effects and are estimated using PPML. GVC
denotes the SCF ratio. Proximity refers to the importance of the proximity between supplier and customer as
derived from O*NET. In Columns 3 and 4, the number of observations reduces to 320,754 observations, because
we lack industry-level information on the tasks performed across occupations from O*NET for the Year 2000.
Standard errors are clustered by country pairs interacted with industry categories. The p-values read as follows:
*p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
26 The electronic and optical industry has one of the highest SCF ratios (equal to 0.44), while textile and leather has a
ratio of 0.30. The difference in the effect between the two industries can be calculated as ((0.44–0.30) 0.955)/
0.293¼ 46%.
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The second channel entails helping multinationals join global supply chains and fragment-
ing their production processes across countries.
6. Conclusions
MNEs and their network of foreign affiliates are important players in today’s global econ-
omy, coordinating trade and organising GVCs. Therefore, understanding the effect of trade
agreements on the activities of multinational firms is a fundamental question that has not
been extensively studied in the literature. Using a novel database, this article makes one
of the first attempts to empirically assess the link between PTAs and MP for a large set of
developed and emerging economies while looking separately at the manufacturing and
services sectors. Thanks to the granularity of our data, we have also introduced a novel
categorisation of the motives driving MNE activities abroad based on a decomposition of
foreign affiliates’ production.
Using a structural gravity model, we provide several novel empirical contributions to
the literature. We find that country pairs with trade agreements including a substantive in-
vestment provision tend to have higher MP of goods and services. The magnitude of our
estimate is quite sizeable: on average, having an investment provision is associated with
increased MP up to 26% in the manufacturing sector and 34% in the service sector. This
effect is stronger for MP of services than goods, consistent with our finding that the effect
of investment provisions on MP is stronger for industries requiring proximity between pro-
ducers and final consumers. We also find that it takes on average at least 2 years for in-
vestment provisions to increase MP of goods and services, suggesting that deep
liberalisation takes time to materialise. Our results are robust to the inclusion of other
deep provisions in trade agreements and BITs, to a falsification test and to the instrumen-
tation of investment provisions. Our combined evidence suggests that trade agreements
including investment provisions have been a critical determinant in boosting MNEs’ pro-
duction activities abroad.
Moreover, we provide evidence consistent with the prominent narrative that deep agree-
ments facilitate access to GVCs by reducing domestic barriers impeding the fragmentation
of production processes. First, we find that the effect of investment provisions is stronger
for foreign affiliates engaged in exporting activities, hinting at a complementary relation-
ship between trade and MP. Secondly, we find that investment provisions tend to increase
MP particularly for industries where production is more fragmented internationally. These
findings suggest that, by allowing access and fair treatment to MNEs, investment provi-
sions help countries participating in GVCs.
As our data cannot distinguish the extensive margin from the intensive margin of MP
and remain at the industry level, we believe that further research, possibly at the firm-
level, could provide additional evidence on the impact of PTAs on MP and the economic
mechanisms at stake. Moreover, since PTAs cover a large set of investment provisions
involving both market access and national treatment (in the pre-establishment and post-
establishment phases), understanding the types of provisions that drive our positive results
also offers avenues for future research.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to Richard Baldwin, Charles Cadestin, Koen de Backer, Neha Deopa, Rebecca
Freeman, Beata Javorcik, Woori Lee, Rodrigo Polanco, Felix Tintelnot, and seminar






/joeg/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jeg/lbab031/6386979 by guest on 13 O
ctober 2021
participants at the EUI conference on services trade, DEGIT XXIII 2018 and the OECD
workshop on MP for helpful comments and suggestions. The authors are also extremely
grateful to the editor, Frédéric Robert-Nicoud, and three anonymous reviewers for their
constructive and helpful comments. The authors are solely responsible for any errors con-
tained in the article.
Supplementary material
A complete replication package, including our novel database on multinational production
and all codes to generate the figures and tables in the paper, is available at this link:
https://github.com/DavideRigo/MiroudotRigo.
Funding
The research leading to these results has received funding from the Swiss National
Science Foundation [Grant number 162511].
References
Alfaro, L., Charlton, A. (2009) Intra-industry foreign direct investment. American Economic Review,
99: 2096–2119.
Ali-Yrkko, J., Leino, T. (2014) How Well does Foreign Direct Investment Measure Real Investment
by Foreign-owned Companies? Firm-level Analysis. Research Discussion Paper No. 12-2014,
Bank of Finland.
Allee, T., Elsig, M. (2019) Are the contents of international treaties copied and pasted? Evidence
from preferential trade agreements. International Studies Quarterly, 63: 603–613.
Alviarez, V. (2019) Multinational production and comparative advantage. Journal of International
Economics, 119: 1–54.
Anderson, J. E., Larch, M., Yotov, Y. V. (2019) Trade and investment in the global economy: a
multi-country dynamic analysis. European Economic Review, 120: 103311.
Anderson, J. E., Milot, C. A., Yotov, Y. V. (2014) How much does geography deflect services trade?
Canadian answers. International Economic Review, 55: 791–818.
Andrenelli, A., Cadestin, C., De Backer, K., Miroudot, S., Rigo, D., Ye, M. (2018) Multinational
production and trade in services. OECD Trade Policy Papers No. 212, OECD Publishing, Paris.
Andrews, I., Stock, J. H., Sun, L. (2019) Weak instruments in instrumental variables regression: the-
ory and practice. Annual Review of Economics, 11: 727–753.
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Bénassy-Quéré, A., Coupet, M., Mayer, T. (2007) Institutional determinants of foreign direct invest-
ment. World Economy, 30: 764–782.
Bergstrand, J. H., Egger, P. (2007) A knowledge-and-physical-capital model of international trade
flows, foreign direct investment, and multinational enterprises. Journal of International
Economics, 73: 278–308.
Bergstrand, J. H., Larch, M., Yotov, Y. V. (2015) Economic integration agreements, border effects,
and distance elasticities in the gravity equation. European Economic Review, 78: 307–327.
Bernard, A. B., Jensen, J. B., Redding, S. J., Schott, P. K. (2018) Global firms. Journal of Economic
Literature, 56: 565–619.
Beugelsdijk, S., Hennart, J.-F., Slangen, A., Smeets, R. (2010) Why and how FDI stocks are a
biased measure of MNE affiliate activity. Journal of International Business Studies, 41:
1444–1459.
Blanchard, E., Matschke, X. (2015) U.S. multinationals and preferential market access. Review of
Economics and Statistics, 97: 839–854.
Blanchard, O., Acalin, J. (2016) What does measured FDI actually measure? Technical report, PIIE
Policy Brief, Peterson Institute for International Economics.
Brainard, S. L. (1997) An empirical assessment of the proximity-concentration trade-off between
multinational sales and trade. American Economic Review, 87: 520–544.
Busse, M., Königer, J., Nunnenkamp, P. (2010) FDI promotion through bilateral investment treaties:
more than a bit? Review of World Economics, 146: 14–177.
Cadestin, C., Backer, K. D., Miroudot, S., Moussiegt, L., Rigo, D., Ye, M. (2019) Multinational
enterprises in domestic value chains. OECD Science, Technology and Industry Policy Papers,
Vol. 63, OECD Publishing, Paris.
Cadestin, C., De Backer, K., Desnoyers-James, I., Miroudot, S., Rigo, D., Ye, M. (2018a)
Multinational Enterprises and Global Value Chains: The OECD Analytical AMNE Database.
OECD Trade Policy Papers No. 211, OECD Publishing, Paris.
Cadestin, C., De Backer, K., Desnoyers-James, I., Miroudot, S., Ye, M., Rigo, D. (2018b)
Multinational enterprises and global value chains: new insights on the trade-investment nexus.
OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers No. 2018/05, OECD Publishing, Paris.
Cadot, O., Estevadeordal, A., Suwa-Eisenmann, A., Eisenmann, A. S., Verdier, T. (2006) The Origin
of Goods: Rules of Origin in Regional Trade Agreements. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Chornyi, V., Nerushay, M., Crawford, J. A. (2016) A survey of investment provisions in regional
trade agreements. WTO Working Paper, No. 2016-07, WTO Publishing, Geneva.
Christen, E., Francois, J. (2017) Modes of supply for US exports of services. The World Economy,
40: 517–531.
Correia, S., Guimar~aes, P., Zylkin, T. (2020) ppmlhdfe: fast poisson estimation with
high-dimensional fixed effects. The Stata Journal, 20: 453–458.
Costinot, A., Oldenski, L., Rauch, J. (2011) Adaptation and the boundary of multinational firms. The
Review of Economics and Statistics, 93: 298–308.
Dai, M., Yotov, Y. V., Zylkin, T. (2014) On the trade-diversion effects of free trade agreements.
Economics Letters, 122: 321–325.
Dhingra, S., Freeman, R., Huang, H. (2021) The impact of non-tariff barriers on trade and welfare.
CEP Discussion Papers No. 1742, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
Dür, A., Baccini, L., Elsig, M. (2014) The design of international trade agreements: introducing a
new dataset. The Review of International Organizations, 9: 353–375.
Egger, P., Larch, M., Yotov, Y. (2020) Gravity-model estimation with time-interval data: revisiting
the impact of free trade agreements. School of Economics Working Paper Series 2020-11, LeBow
College of Business, Drexel University.
Egger, P., Merlo, V. (2012) Bits bite: an anatomy of the impact of bilateral investment treaties on
multinational firms. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 114: 1240–1266.
Ekholm, K., Forslid, R., Markusen, J. R. (2007) Export-platform foreign direct investment. Journal
of the European Economic Association, 5: 776–795.
Falvey, R., Foster-McGregor, N. (2017) Heterogeneous effects of bilateral investment treaties.
Review of World Economics, 153: 631–656.






/joeg/advance-article/doi/10.1093/jeg/lbab031/6386979 by guest on 13 O
ctober 2021
Federico, S. (2016) How does multinational production affect the measurement of competitiveness?
Occasional Paper No. 301, Bank of Italy.
Fukui, T., Lakatos, C. (2012) A global database of foreign affiliate sales. Technical report, GTAP
Research Memoranda 4009, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Department of Agricultural
Economics, Purdue University.
Herger, N., McCorriston, S. (2016) Horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate cross-border acquisitions.
IMF Economic Review, 64: 319–353.
Ito, T. (2013) Export-platform foreign direct investment: theory and evidence. The World Economy,
36: 563–581.
Kimura, F., Lee, H. H. (2006) The gravity equation in international trade in services. Review of
World Economics, 142: 92–121.
Kleinert, J., Toubal, F. (2010) Gravity for FDI. Review of International Economics, 18: 1–13.
Koopman, R., Wang, Z., Wei, S. J. (2008) How much of Chinese exports is really made in China?
Assessing domestic value-added when processing trade is pervasive. NBER Working Papers No.
14109, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Kotschwar, B. (2009) Mapping Investment Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: Towards an
International Investment Regime? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kox, H. L., Rojas-Romagosa, H. (2020) How trade and investment agreements affect bilateral for-
eign direct investment: results from a structural gravity model. The World Economy, 43:
3203–3242.
Lakatos, C., Nilsson, L. (2016) The EU-Korea FTA: anticipation, trade policy uncertainty and im-
pact. Review of World Economics, 153: 179–198.
Lee, W. (2019) Services liberalization and global value chain participation: new evidence for hetero-
geneous effects by income level and provisions. Review of International Economics, 27: 888–915.
Lesher, M., Miroudot, S. (2006) Analysis of the economic impact of investment provisions in re-
gional trade agreements. OECD Trade Policy Papers No. 36, OECD Publishing, Paris.
Lin, W., Wooldridge, J. M. (2019) Testing and correcting for endogeneity in nonlinear unobserved
effects models. Panel Data Econometrics, pp. 21–43. Amsterdam, Netherlands: Elsevier.
Markusen, J. R. (2004) Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Mattoo, A., Mulabdic, A., Ruta, M. (2017) Trade creation and trade diversion in deep agreements.
Policy Research Working Paper No. 8206, The World Bank.
Mattoo, A., Rocha, N., Ruta, M. (2020) The evolution of deep trade agreements. Policy Research
Working Paper No. 9283, The World Bank.
Miroudot, S., Cadestin, C. (2017) Services in global value chains. OECD Trade Policy Papers No.
197, OECD Publishing, Paris.
Miroudot, S., Ye, M. (2020) Multinational production in value-added terms. Economic Systems
Research, 32: 395–412.
Mulabdic, A., Osnago, A., Ruta, M. (2017) Deep integration and UK-EU trade relations. Policy
Research Working Paper No. 7947, The World Bank.
Oldenski, L. (2012) Export versus FDI and the communication of complex information. Journal of
International Economics, 87: 312–322.
Olea, J. L. M., Pflueger, C. (2013) A robust test for weak instruments. Journal of Business &
Economic Statistics, 31: 358–369.
Orefice, G., Rocha, N. (2014) Deep integration and production networks: an empirical analysis. The
World Economy, 37: 106–136.
Osnago, A., Rocha, N., Ruta, M. (2019) Deep trade agreements and vertical FDI: the devil is in the
details. Canadian Journal of Economics, 52: 1558–1599.
Ramondo, N., Rodrı́guez-Clare, A., Tintelnot, F. (2015) Multinational production: data and stylized
facts. American Economic Review, 105: 530–536.
Ray, A. (2016) Expanding multinationals-conglomerate M&A and activity-basket proximity. Paper
presented at the 19th Annual Conference on Global Economic Analysis, Washington, DC, USA.
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Table A1. List of treaties identifying the coefficients of interest
Year Name Type Region
2001 European Free Trade Association (EFTA)—Mexico 3 Intercontinental
2001 Estonia—Hungary-Free Trade Agreement 1 Europe
2002 Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement—China accession 5 Asia
2002 Bulgaria—Estonia Free Trade Agreement 1 Europe
2002 Bulgaria—Lithuania Free Trade Agreement 1 Europe
2002 Croatia—EFTA 3 Europe
2003 Bulgaria—Latvia Free Trade Agreement 1 Europe
2003 Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)—Croatia accession 5 Europe
2003 Croatia—Lithuania Free Trade Agreement 5 Europe
2003 Croatia—Turkey Free Trade Agreement 5 Europe
2004 EU Enlargement (25)—Czech Republic accession 6 Europe
2004 EU Enlargement (25)—Estonia accession 6 Europe
2004 EU Enlargement (25)—Hungary accession 6 Europe
2004 EU Enlargement (25)—Lithuania accession 6 Europe
2004 EU Enlargement (25)—Latvia accession 6 Europe
2004 EU Enlargement (25)—Poland accession 6 Europe
2004 EU Enlargement (25)—Slovakia accession 6 Europe
2004 EU Enlargement (25)—Slovenia accession 6 Europe
2005 Croatia—EU Stabilisation and Association Agreement 3 Europe
2005 Japan—Mexico Economic Partnership Agreement 1 Intercontinental
2005 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—China Free Trade Agreement 3 Asia
2005 Australia—US Free Trade Agreement 1 Intercontinental
2006 EFTA—Korea Free Trade Agreement 3 Intercontinental
2007 EU Enlargement (27)—Bulgaria accession 6 Intercontinental
2007 EU Enlargement (27)—Romania accession 6 Intercontinental
2008 Preferential Tariff Arrangement-Group of Eight Developing Countries 2 Intercontinental
2008 Indonesia—Japan Economic Partnership Agreement 1 Asia
2008 ASEAN—Japan-Free Trade Agreement 3 Asia
2009 Canada—EFTA-Free Trade Agreement 3 Intercontinental
2009 Japan—Switzerland Economic Partnership Agreement 1 Intercontinental
2010 ASEAN—Australia-Free Trade Agreement 4 Intercontinental
2010 India—Korea Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement 1 Asia
2011 EU—Korea Free Trade Agreement 3 Intercontinental
2011 India—Japan Economic Partnership Agreement 1 Asia
2012 Korea—US-Free Trade Agreement 1 Intercontinental
2013 EU Enlargement (27)—Croatia accession 6 Europe
2014 China—Switzerland Free Trade Agreement 1 Intercontinental
2014 Australia—Korea-Free Trade Agreement 1 Intercontinental
Note: The variable Type denotes the type of agreement and takes the following values: 1, bilateral; 2, plurilateral;
3, plurilateral and third country; 4, region-region (e.g. CARIFORUM EC EPA); 5, accession (e.g. UK EU acces-
sion agreement signed in 1972); 6, accession to an agreement as a result of membership in a regional agreement
(e.g. when Romania entered the EU, it also signed up to the FTA between the EU and Mexico signed in 2000);
7, withdrawal. Year indicates the year in which the agreement entered into force. Region denotes the geographic
location of signatory states.
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Table A2. List of countries
Country Income group (in 2000) OECD countries (in 2000)
Australia High income OECD
Austria High income OECD
Belgium High income OECD
Brazil Upper middle income Non-OECD
Bulgaria Lower middle income Non-OECD
Canada High income OECD
China Lower middle income Non-OECD
Croatia Upper middle income Non-OECD
Czech Republic Upper middle income OECD
Denmark High income OECD
Estonia Upper middle income Non-OECD
Finland High income OECD
France High income OECD
Germany High income OECD
Greece High income OECD
Hungaria Upper middle income OECD
India Low income Non-OECD
Indonesia Low income Non-OECD
Ireland High income OECD
Italy High income OECD
Japan High income OECD
Korea Upper middle income OECD
Latvia Lower middle income Non-OECD
Lithuania Lower middle income Non-OECD
Luxembourg High income OECD
Mexico Upper middle income OECD
Netherlands High income OECD
Norway High income OECD
Poland Upper middle income OECD
Portugal High income OECD
Romania Lower middle income Non-OECD
Russia Lower middle income Non-OECD
Slovak Republic Upper middle income OECD
Slovenia High income Non-OECD
Spain High income OECD
Sweden High income OECD
Switzerland High income OECD
Taiwan High income Non-OECD
Turkey Upper middle income OECD
UK High income OECD
USA High income OECD
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Table A3. List of industries
ISIC Rev. 4 Goods/services Label
A – Agriculture
B – Mining
10-12 Goods Food and tobacco
13-15 Goods Textile and leather
16 Goods Wood
17-18 Goods Paper and printing
19 Goods Coke and Petroleum
20-21 Goods Chemicals
22 Goods Rubber and plastics
23 Goods Mineral products
24 Goods Basic metals
25 Goods Metal products




30 Goods Other transport
31-32 Goods Furniture
33 Goods Repair and installation
35-36 – Utilities
37-39 – Sewerage and waste management
F – Construction
G Services Wholesale and retail trade
49 Services Land transport
50 Services Water transport
51 Services Air transport
52 Services Warehousing and transport support
53 Services Postal and courier
I Services Accommodation and food
58 Services Publishing activities
59-60 Services Motion picture and broadcasting
61 Services Telecommunications
62-63 Services Computer and information services
K Services Finance and insurance
L Services Real estate
M Services Professional and scientific services
N Services Administrative services
O – Public Administration
P – Education
Q – Health
R-S – Arts, recreation and other services
T – Household
U – Extraterritorial organisations
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Table A4. Estonia EU membership timeline
Year Date Event Note
1991 20 August Restoration of independence from USSR –
1994 18 July Free trade agreement concluded –
1995 1 January Free trade agreement in force Shallow PTA
12 June Europe Agreement concluded –
24 November Applied for Membership –
1998 1 January Europe Agreement comes into force Deep PTA including pro-
visions on services and
competition
March Membership negotiations open –
1999 – 17 chapters opened –
2000 – 6 chapters opened –
2002 December All chapters closed and negotiations
concluded
–
2003 8 April Draft accession treaty approved by Estonian
government
–
16 April Treaty of Accession signed –
14 September Referendum on membership approved –
2004 1 May Acceded to EU Investment provision þ
Deep PTA with third
countries (e.g. EFTA)
28 June Joined ERM
2007 21 December Entered the Schengen area –
2011 1 January Adoption of the euro –
1 May Right to limit migration from 2004 countries
expired
–
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B. Robustness checks
In this section, we present several additional robustness checks to provide further confidence
in our main conclusions. First, our results are robust to controlling for the age and different
waves of trade agreements. Since deep trade agreements are typically signed later than shal-
low PTAs, one potential concern of our estimation strategy is that investment provisions may
capture the growing impact over time of shallow PTAs, which would bias the effect of invest-
ment provisions upwards. The results in Appendix Table B1 control for the age of PTAs,
while Appendix Table B2 controls for different waves of PTAs by including interaction terms
between the variable PTA and year dummies.
Secondly, even with the rich set of fixed effects included in (1), the issue of endogeneity is
not fully tackled if there are other time-varying unobserved changes in bilateral costs that are
country-pair specific (such as bilateral costs of information and communications technology).
To address this concern, we follow Bergstrand et al. (2015) by including the interaction be-
tween year dummies and a dummy variable (Borderij), which equals 1 if the partner and des-
tination country are different and 0 otherwise. These interaction terms capture all bilateral
factors influencing (on average) international relative to intra-national production over time
(relative to a base period). The key findings are also robust to this specification (see
Appendix Table B3).
Finally, we include a dummy variable for countries belonging to the European Union (EU)
in our baseline specification. We believe that EU enlargement agreements may be different
from all other PTAs. First, these agreements create free movement of capital and people and
are not comparable with the provisions found in traditional PTAs signed between countries
that offer preferential treatment but have no intention to fully integrate their markets.
Secondly, enlargement agreements set up a progressive liberalisation based on how ready the
country is to join the EU. As a result, they are anticipated by Stabilisation and Accession
Table A5. Cross-correlation table




Proc prov SPS prov TBT prov IPR prov Depth BIT
PTA 1.000 – – – – – – – – –
Serv prov 0.777 1.000 – – – – – – – –
Inv prov 0.634 0.808 1.000 – – – – – – –
Comp prov 0.717 0.918 0.876 1.000 – – – – – –
Proc prov 0.756 0.860 0.723 0.776 1.000 – – – – –
SPS prov 0.934 0.830 0.677 0.765 0.810 1.000 – – – –
TBT prov 0.935 0.831 0.678 0.767 0.809 0.980 1.000 – – –
IPR prov 0.681 0.755 0.830 0.722 0.756 0.727 0.728 1.000 – –
Depth 0.876 0.947 0.836 0.902 0.914 0.933 0.934 0.854 1.000 –
BIT 0.132 0.047 0.035 0.037 0.061 0.140 0.127 0.020 0.079 1.000
Note: Serv prov denotes trade agreements including a substantive provision stipulating the liberalisation of trade
in services, Comp prov including a competition chapter and Inv prov including an investment chapter within or
beyond a services chapter. The other provision categories identify trade agreements containing concrete provisions
on public procurement (Proc prov), a chapter or a provision on sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS prov)
and technical barriers to trade (TBT prov). Finally, IPR prov denotes a trade agreement including a substantive
provision on protecting intellectual property rights and BIT stands for bilateral investment treaties.
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agreements years before the official accession, which might already reduce tariffs and non-
tariffs barriers, affecting MNEs’ trade and investment strategies (Lakatos and Nilsson,
2016).27 Appendix Table B4 shows that the inclusion of the EU dummy does not contradict
our main conclusions. Moreover, becoming part of the EU is generally associated with lower
MP of goods and services. As a final robustness check, we replicate our baseline analysis
(based on (Equation 1)) on the sample of country pairs where the host and partner countries
are either a member of the EU or the USA. As shown in Appendix Table B5, the results re-
main consistent with our main findings.
Table B1. Effects on MP of goods and services: shallow PTA age
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Goods Goods Services Services
Variables FA output FA output FA output FA output
PTA 0.208** 0.0517 0.122** 0.117
(0.0963) (0.0882) (0.0593) (0.0964)
Inv prov – 0.216** – 0.293***
– (0.0978) – (0.103)
PTA age 0.0442*** 0.0421*** 0.0605*** 0.0586***
(0.00778) (0.00773) (0.00655) (0.00663)
Observations 13,440 13,440 13,408 13,408
Note: The dependent variable is MP of goods in Columns 1 and 2 and MP of services in Columns 3 and 4. All
specifications are obtained with data for Years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014; all include
partner-time, host-time and partner-host fixed effects and are estimated using PPML. PTA Age equals 1 if t is the
first year for the country pair to have a PTA in force. PTA Age varies between 1 and 8, since there are 8 years
included in the analysis. Standard errors are clustered by country pairs. The p-values read as follows: *p< 0.1,
**p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
27 See, as an example, Table A4 in the Appendix, showing Estonia’s accession timeline to the EU.
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Table B2. Effects on MP of goods and services: year dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Goods Goods Services Services
Variables FA output FA output FA output FA output
PTA 0.293*** 0.143 0.253*** 0.0698
(0.0921) (0.0874) (0.0535) (0.0941)
Inv prov – 0.203** – 0.220**
– (0.0950) – (0.101)
PTA*y2000 0.481*** 0.468*** 0.598*** 0.585***
(0.0634) (0.0631) (0.0670) (0.0674)
PTA*y2002 0.166*** 0.153*** 0.363*** 0.349***
(0.0493) (0.0493) (0.0520) (0.0532)
PTA*y2004 0.123*** 0.120*** 0.160*** 0.156***
(0.0447) (0.0445) (0.0427) (0.0430)
PTA*y2006 0.106** 0.103** 0.126*** 0.122***
(0.0431) (0.0430) (0.0341) (0.0343)
PTA*y2008 0.0145 0.0141 0.0279 0.0296
(0.0363) (0.0363) (0.0357) (0.0358)
PTA*y2010 0.0413 0.0408 0.0320 0.0297
(0.0299) (0.0300) (0.0250) (0.0250)
PTA*y2012 0.00125 0.000526 0.00976 0.0102
(0.0266) (0.0262) (0.0242) (0.0242)
Observations 13,440 13,440 13,408 13,408
Note: The dependent variable is MP of goods in Columns 1 and 2 and MP of services in Columns 3 and 4. All
specifications are obtained with data for Years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014; all include
partner-time, host-time and partner-host fixed effects and are estimated using PPML. Standard errors are clustered
by country pairs. The p-values read as follows: *p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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Table B3. Effects on MP of goods & services: border-year dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Goods Goods Services Services
Variables FA output FA output FA output FA output
PTA 0.147* 0.0264 0.0878 0.153
(0.0876) (0.0884) (0.0576) (0.0949)
Inv prov – 0.165* – 0.293***
– (0.0925) – (0.0994)
Border*y2000 0.538*** 0.532*** 0.340*** 0.333***
(0.0493) (0.0491) (0.0534) (0.0533)
Border*y2002 0.399*** 0.392*** 0.373*** 0.365***
(0.0434) (0.0432) (0.0460) (0.0463)
Border*y2004 0.312*** 0.308*** 0.253*** 0.250***
(0.0409) (0.0407) (0.0338) (0.0340)
Border*y2006 0.267*** 0.263*** 0.164*** 0.161***
(0.0367) (0.0363) (0.0366) (0.0368)
Border*y2008 0.103*** 0.100*** 0.00848 0.00658
(0.0295) (0.0292) (0.0306) (0.0307)
Border*y2010 0.105*** 0.101*** 0.0683*** 0.0659***
(0.0242) (0.0241) (0.0224) (0.0225)
Border*y2012 0.0464** 0.0449** 0.00821 0.00767
(0.0199) (0.0198) (0.0181) (0.0181)
Observations 13,440 13,440 13,408 13,408
Note: The dependent variable is MP of goods in Columns 1 and 2 and MP of services in Columns 3 and 4. All
specifications are obtained with data for Years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014; all include
partner-time, host-time and partner-host fixed effects and are estimated using PPML. Standard errors are clustered
by country pairs. The p-values read as follows: *p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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Table B5. PTA effects on MP of goods and services: EU–US sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Goods Goods Services Services
Variables FA output FA output FA output FA output
PTA 0.140 0.229 0.102 0.200
(0.142) (0.171) (0.140) (0.187)
Inv prov – 0.496*** – 0.470***
– (0.122) – (0.125)
Observations 11,872 11,872 11,840 11,840
Note: The dependent variable in Columns 1 and 2 is MP of goods and in Columns 3 and 4 is MP of services.
All specifications are obtained with data for Years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014; all in-
clude partner-time, host-time and partner-host fixed effects and are estimated using PPML. The partner and host
country are either an EU member country or the USA. Standard errors are clustered by country pairs. The p-val-
ues read as follows: *p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
Table B4. Effects on MP of goods and services: EU dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Goods Goods Services Services
Variables FA output FA output FA output FA output
PTA 0.265*** 0.0668 0.231*** 0.360***
(0.0866) (0.100) (0.0494) (0.127)
Inv prov – 0.452*** – 0.710***
– (0.121) – (0.129)
EU 0.0180 0.460*** 0.0429 0.838***
(0.140) (0.159) (0.210) (0.271)
Observations 13,440 13,440 13,408 13,408
Note: The dependent variable is MP of goods in Columns 1 and 2 and MP of services in Columns 3 and 4. All
specifications are obtained with data for Years 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014; all include
partner-time, host-time and partner-host fixed effects and are estimated using PPML. Standard errors are clustered
by country pairs. The p-values read as follows: *p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
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C. MP data
Our analysis relies on two novel databases on MP. First, we build a novel bilateral matrix of
output according to the country of ownership of firms. The database covers 41 countries,
which account for more than 85% of world GDP, 43 industries (across the primary, manufac-
turing and services sector) and the period 2000–2014. This bilateral matrix builds on the
OECD AMNEs and the data are made consistent with output as measured in the ICIO tables
from the WIOD database.
The OECD AMNE database contains the official data collected and published by National
Statistical Offices and Central Banks on activities of MNEs. The coverage of AMNE data
has been increasing over time, with a particularly good coverage for the USA and EU coun-
tries (as an EU regulation obliges countries to provide AMNE data to Eurostat). The OECD
AMNE database contains data for 32 OECD countries plus Costa Rica and Lithuania, over
more than 50 industries with the first year of reporting 1985. However, information is not
equally available across countries, industries and years with data typically less available for
earlier years and more disaggregated levels (e.g. bilateral at industry level). When there is no
observation on the activities of foreign-owned firms, these data are estimated using different
statistical methods: outward statistics, correlation with FDI data, interpolation methods and a
gravity model. See Cadestin et al. (2018a) for further details on the methods used to estimate
the missing values. Finally, we also use information coming from FDI statistics to identify
zero AMNE sales.
Secondly, we split for the first time ICIO tables from WIOD according to ownership, dis-
entangling the contribution to trade and output of domestic- and foreign-owned firms. Our
methodology is divided into two steps. As a starting point, we create three matrices on out-
put, value added and trade (import and export) split according to ownership and consistent
with WIOD data. These matrices are first filled with the existing available information and
then completed with estimates. The next step consists in splitting the WIOD ICIO tables with
all cells divided into the contribution of domestic- and foreign-owned firms. This is done in a
single quadratic optimisation that uses as objectives the data from the three matrices previ-
ously constructed (output, value-added and trade by country, industry and ownership) and as
a constraint the output, value-added and trade reported in the WIOD database. The resulting
tables are fully balanced and have the same properties as the original WIOD tables. See
Cadestin et al. (2018a) for further details on the methodology used to split the ICIO tables.
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